In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Breaking the Revolutionary Deadlock?Volney's Leçons and the Debate on the Value of HistoryNiccolò ValmoriThis article explores the crucial contribution of Constantin-François de Chasseboeuf, better known by his pen name, Volney, to the eighteenth-century debate on the nature of history as a discipline.1 My claim is that Volney's Leçons d'histoire is the result of a complex dynamic between two forces: on the one hand, (...) a century-long debate on how history should be both written and taught; on the other, the revolutionary calls for a thoroughgoing revision of the past amid concurrent references to the virtuous moral examples of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Volney had a very narrow gap to "save" history from deadlock between these opposite perspectives. His history course at the École normale supérieure showed how the eventful years of the French Revolution had changed his own understanding of the discipline of history.I argue that Volney's supposed distrust toward the importance of the study of history was not an attempt to devalue history itself.2 On the contrary, the French author approached history as a discipline based on the principle [End Page 773] of investigative doubt and on dialogue with other scientific domains such as geography, geology, and meteorology. As Jean Gaulmier puts it: "The true heirs of Volney's dream of a total history were Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch."3 However, if Volney's proposal for a new historiography is set within the eighteenth-century debate on how to write and teach history, it appears neither original nor new. Nonetheless, I argue, Volney attempted a synthesis between divergent positions on the role of history, as they emerged and were debated during the eighteenth century in the light of the first years of the French Revolution. The context of the French Revolution left Volney with more doubts than certainty on the value of the discipline, given the manifold and controversial uses of historical examples proposed in those years. As Minchul Kim has pointed out, Volney's Leçons are a "work in history rather than a work on history."4 While Kim is right to point out the importance of the revolutionary context for understanding Volney's skepticism toward the value of history, I argue that while Volney's personal understanding of how history should be written matured through the revolutionary experience, it was also the fruit of a dialogue with Enlightenment historiography.In the first part of the article, I present the main features of the eighteenth-century debate on the limits and meaning of writing history, with a particular focus on its relationship with ancient history and on the stature of history among the other disciplines. In the second part, I analyze how Volney dealt with this debate in some of his works that preceded his appointment to the chair of history at the École normale. Three of Volney's pre-1795 works are considered here: Voyages en Syrie et en Égypte (1787), Considérations sur la guerre actuelle des Turcs (1788), and Les Ruines (which was published during the Revolution). In the last section of the article I delve into the Leçons to highlight how this work represented Volney's provisional resolution of the long debate over the role of history as a scientific endeavor as well as a subject that could be taught. [End Page 774]ENLIGHTENMENT HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE TEACHING OF HISTORY: THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY QUESTIn this section I review the main contributors to the Enlightenment historiographical debate on the status of history as a discipline and on its relationship with antiquity. I do not claim to cover all aspects of Enlightenment historiography; rather I aim to set Volney's contribution to these two aspects of the debate in a broader context. His open skepticism toward the heuristic value of history cannot be reduced simply to a reaction to the political uses and misuses of history during the French Revolution. Volney's Leçons addressed a larger audience than the select group of French teachers attending his class. The philosopher-traveler, as his contemporaries called him, joined a conversation about history that had started at... (shrink)

The French writer, explorer, and historian Constantin-François de Volney (1757–1820) has been interpreted as embracing a Eurocentric Orientalism and a typically Enlightenment progressivist historical understanding. In this article, however, I argue that, far from simply offering yet another rationalistic or teleological historical narrative, Volney set out to refound the historical discipline by erecting historiography on a firmly empirical basis in order to repudiate the idea of historical design altogether. In this respect, his best-known work, The Ruins, (...) or Meditations on the Revolutions of Empires (1791), seems to occupy a special status in his oeuvre in that it did not confine its analyses to the epistemological realm and historiographical practice, but explicitly linked historical narratives and practice to historical developments themselves, ascribing civilizational decline and devastation predominantly to ignorance and blind faith in religion or myths of the past. According to this reasoning, a new, more critical historical practice – akin to social anthropology – would, by making people conscious of their historical agency, liberate historical development itself and ideally bring an end to seemingly unending cycles of political tyranny and social destruction. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article treats the universal history Ruins, or Meditation on the Revolutions of Empires (Les ruines ou Méditations sur les révolutions des empires) of the French cultural philosopher Constantin-François Volney (1757–1820). Using a textual, interdisciplinary study, which focuses upon Volney’s complex cultural and historical philosophical contexts, I demonstrate that his primary concern was a nearly 2500 years coherent Europe of tradition and reception: this Europe did not represent a western corner of a larger Asian landmass (...) but, in the late eighteenth century, rather offered the opportunity for a complex and harmonious unity of European peoples under French circumstances. Volney chose the ruins of the desert town of Palmyra as the starting point of his historical and philosophical reflections. As a cultural philosopher of the late Enlightenment, he looks past the divine workings of the course of history in order to take instead the finite, man-made world as his focal interest. The following pages emphasize these reflections on human history that – in the face of a melancholic mode – highlighted the cultural anthropological characteristics and committed them to the promotion of a self-creating future. (shrink)

This article analyses the complex and contested geo-politics associated with the concept of a universal human society during the era of the French Revolution. It focuses on the figure of Constantin-François Volney (1757?1820), a neglected philosopher who played a significant role in the history of both French anti-imperialist thought and French imperial practice in North Africa and the Levant. It uses that focus to explore the relationship between visions of human emancipation and the exercise of global power (...) during the 1790s and beyond. (shrink)

The French Revolution had a complex relationship with historical thought. In a significant sense, the politics of 1789 was built upon a rejection of the authority of the past. As old institutions and practices were swept away, many champions of the Revolution attacked conventional historical modes for legitimating authority, seeking to replace them with a politics anchored in notions of reason, natural law and natural rights. Yet history was not so easily purged from politics. In practice, symbols and images borrowed (...) from the past saturated Revolutionary culture. The factional disputes of the 1790s, too, invoked history in a range of ways. The politics of nature itself often relied on a range of historical propositions and, as the Revolution developed, a new battle between “ancients” and ‘moderns’ gradually emerged amongst those seeking to direct the future of France. This article explores these issues by focusing on a series of lectures delivered at the École Normale in the Year III (1795), in the wake of Thermidor and the fall of Robespierre. The lectures, commissioned by the Ministry of Education, were designed to lay out a program for historical pedagogy in the French Republic. Their author, Constantin-Francois Volney (1757–1820), was one of a group of figures who sought, during these years, to stabilise French politics by tying it to the development of a new form of social science—a science that would eventually be labelled “idéologie.” With this in mind, Volney sought to promote historical study as an antidote to the political appropriation of the past, with particular reference to its recent uses in France. In doing so, he also sought to appropriate the past for political purposes. These lectures illustrate a series of tensions in the wider Revolutionary relationship with history, particularly during the Thermidorian moment. They also, however, reflect ongoing ambiguities in the social role of the discipline and the self-understanding of its practitioners. (shrink)

In a recent paper (Linguistics and Philosophy 23, 4, June 2000), Jason Stanley argues that there are no `unarticulated constituents', contrary to what advocates of Truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP) have claimed. All truth-conditional effects of context can be traced to logical form, he says. In this paper I maintain that there are unarticulated constituents, and I defend TCP. Stanley's argument exploits the fact that the alleged unarticulated constituents can be `bound', that is, they can be made to vary with the values (...) introduced by operators in the sentence. I show that Stanley's argument rests on a fallacy, and I provide alternative analyses of the data. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze: The Intensive Reduction brings together eighteen essays written by an internationally acclaimed team of scholars to provide a comprehensive overview of the work of Gilles Deleuze, one of the most important and influential European thinkers of the twentieth century. Each essay addresses a central issue in Deleuzeʹs philosophy (and that of his regular co-author, Félix Guattari) that remains to this day controversial and unsettled. Since Deleuzeʹs death in 1994, the technical aspects of his philosophy have been largely neglected. (...) These essays address that gap in the existing scholarship by focusing on his contribution to philosophy. Each contributor advances the discussion of a contested point in the philosophy of Deleuze to shed new light on as yet poorly-understood problems and to stimulate new and vigorous exchanges regarding his relationship to philosophy, schizoanlysis, his aesthetic, ethical and political thought. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper I present a defence of the Austinian semantic approach to incomplete quantifiers and similar phenomena (section 2-4). It is part of my defence of Austinian semantics that it incorporates a cognitive dimension (section 4). This cognitive dimension makes it possible to connect Austinian semantics to various cognitive theories of discourse interpretation. In the second part of the paper (sections 5-7), I establish connections between Austinian semantics and four particular theories: • the theory of (...) reference and modes of presentation in terms of information files (see e.g. Perry 1993), • the theory of discourse interpretation as involving a process of context selection (see Sperber and Wilson 1986), • the theory of informational structure (for a survey, see Lambrecht 1994), • the theory of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985). (shrink)

Due to Gӧdel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments –Warren (2020), Murzi and Topey (2021)– for the idea that the natural deduction rules for (...) the first-order universal quantifier are categorical, i.e., they uniquely determine its semantic intended meaning. Both of them make use of McGee’s open-endedness requirement and the second one uses in addition Garson’s (2013) local models for defining the validity of these rules. I argue that the success of both these arguments is relative to their semantic or infinitary assumptions, which could be easily discharged if the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is taken to be an infinitary rule, i.e. non-compact. Consequently, I reconsider the use of the ω-rule and I show that the addition of the ω-rule to the standard formalizations of first-order logic is categorical. In addition, I argue that the open-endedness requirement does not make the first-order Peano Arithmetic categorical and I advance an argument for its categoricity based on the inferential conservativity requirement. (shrink)

With AI permeating our lives, there is widespread concern regarding the proper framework needed to morally assess and regulate it. This has given rise to many attempts to devise ethical guidelines that infuse guidance for both AI development and deployment. Our main concern is that, instead of a genuine ethical interest for AI, we are witnessing moral diplomacies resulting in moral bureaucracies battling for moral supremacy and political domination. After providing a short overview of what we term ‘ethics washing’ in (...) the AI industry, we analyze the 2021 UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts (Category II) tasked with drafting the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and show why the term ‘moral diplomacy’ is better suited to explain what is happening in the field of the ethics of AI. Our paper ends with some general considerations regarding the future of the ethics of AI. (shrink)

This study deals with money, especially coins, and intends to circumscribe the place of coinage among cultural objects. Money cannot be described without a semiotics of culture. We shall consider the definitions of value in order to define the evaluative foundations of meaning, and discuss the recurring parallel between signs and coins. Using a theory of anthropic zones, we will then attempt to determine the conditions necessary for the creation of objects of value, which should lead to a typology of (...) the different orders of fascination. (shrink)

K. R. Popper distinguished between two main uses of logic, the demonstrational one, in mathematical proofs, and the derivational one, in the empirical sciences. These two uses are governed by the following methodological constraints: in mathematical proofs one ought to use minimal logical means (logical minimalism), while in the empirical sciences one ought to use the strongest available logic (logical maximalism). In this paper I discuss whether Popper’s critical rationalism is compatible with a revision of logic in the empirical sciences, (...) given the condition of logical maximalism. Apparently, if one ought to use the strongest logic in the empirical sciences, logic would remain immune to criticism and, thus, non-revisable. I will show that critical rationalism is theoretically compatible with a revision of logic in the empirical sciences. However, a question that remains to be clarified by the critical rationalists is what kind of evidence would lead them to revise the system of logic that underlies a physical theory, such as quantum mechanics? Popper’s falsificationist methodology will be compared with the recently advocated extension of the abductive methodology from the empirical sciences to logic by T. Williamson, since both of them arrive at the same conclusion concerning the status of classical logic. (shrink)

This paper — a sequel to my 'Open Quotation' (Mind 2001) — is my reaction to the articles discussing open quotation in the special issue of the Belgian Journal of Linguistics edited by P. De Brabanter in 2005.

Cet article part du point de vue de Fontenelle pour aborder le devenir scientifique de la chimie au sein de l’Académie de la fin du XVIIe siècle à la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle. Contre la vision traditionnelle d’un Fontenelle cartésien centré sur les mathématiques et la physique, le travail du Secrétaire perpétuel de l’Académie Royale des Sciences montre un intérêt réel pour la chimie et les chimistes, ainsi qu’un regard éclairant sur la diversité, les continuités et les évolutions des (...) chimies pratiquées à l’Académie. La confrontation des comptes rendus et des éloges de Fontenelle avec les mémoires des savants révèle une mise en perspective remarquable, à la fois historique et épistémologique, qui souligne la spécificité de la chimie tout en l’articulant avec les autres sciences – notamment la physique. Pluralisant les approches, Fontenelle joue subtilement avec les catégories de la rupture et de la continuité, de la pluralité des pratiques scientifiques et de l’unité d’un horizon commun. Il construit ainsi, non un récit continu de l’évolution de la chimie académique, mais l’image nuancée d’un devenir complexe et pluriel. (shrink)

The Samadhirajasutra is one of the essential canonical texts of the Mahayana Buddhism. Dating from perhaps the second century it presents and early form of the doctrine of the void (sunyavada) one of the principal philosophical doctrines of the Mahayana. In this respect the Sutra is of fundamental philosophical importance; it is notably of major auhtority for the Madhyamaka school which is sunyavada par excellence.

L’enseignement serait devenu, selon certains, tout bonnement impossible. Et en effet les changements récents de la société, le développement de l’individualisme démocratique, la crise de l’autorité et de la transmission, le bouleversement sans précédent provoqué par l’extension des technologies numériques… nous montrent que nous sommes en train de basculer complètement dans une autre époque et de changer radicalement de paradigme. Mais l’éducation en général n’a-t-elle pas toujours été impossible ainsi que Freud le constatait en 1925? Et contre une certaine idéologie (...) scientifique qui la confond avec une impuissance momentanée, n’est-ce pas pourtant à cette impossibilité qu’il nous faut, comme jamais, nous confronter? (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the self-referential component which Searle rightly detects in the truth-conditions of perceptual judgments comes from the perceptual ‘mode' and is not an aspect of the ‘content' of the judgment, contrary to Searle's claim.

In developmental lexical–gustatory synesthesia, specific words can trigger taste perceptions and these synesthetic associations are generally stable. We describe a case of multilingual lexical–gustatory synesthesia for whom some synesthesias were bidirectional as some tastes also triggered auditory word associations. Evoked concurrents could be gustatory but also tactile sensations. In addition to words and pseudowords, many voices were effective inducers, suggesting increased connections between cortical taste areas and both voice-selective and language-selective areas. Lasting changes in some evoked tastes occurred during childhood (...) suggesting that some plasticity can be present after the initial learning of associations. Inducers were often linked to taste concurrents phonologically or semantically, but also through identifiable childhood episodes . Several inducers were phonologically linked to episodic inducers suggesting a process of secondary acquisition for many inducers. Implications of these observations are discussed. (shrink)

Les considérations physiologiques sont étrangères, en tant que telles, au projet de l'Ethique, et sans doute, à l'ensemble des préoccupations philosophiques de Spinoza. Au début de Ia seconde partie de l'Ethique, Spinoza précise clairement: “j'expliquerai seulement ce qui peut nous conduire comme par la main à la connaissance de l’ Arne humaine et de sa béatitude suprême”. Pourtant, le livre ne laisse pas de contenir une révision intéressante du modèle mécaniste que Descartes appliquait à l'explication du corps humain; il contient (...) surtout une hypothèse sur Ia structure organique, qui, nous le croyons, a joué un rôle de modèle pour un certain type de théorie de l'être vivant. Ce type de conception se trouve d'abord dans l'iatromécanisme de Boerhaave et de ses disciples au XVIIIe siècle, mais les séquelles en sont identifiables jusque dans Ia philosophie biologique contemporaine. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to break down to its principal arguments the abundant material recently published in Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe related to a conference given in December 1932 on the principle of noncontradiction (PNC). I will first highlight the importance in phenomenology of a correct interpretation of the PNC and then explain Heidegger's general strategy toward logical principles during the 1920s. After showing that Heidegger's 1932 interpretation of the PNC still pertains to Being and Time's fundamental ontology, I will (...) present Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's Metaphysics Γ 3 and 4 that is the center of the conference. I will conclude by showing how the ontological significance of the PNC makes sense in the fundamental‐ontological context in which the understanding‐of‐being serves as the condition of possibility of our encounter with entities. (shrink)